Ahora Cuba, June 28, 2007
A new ophthalmologic center with Cuban equipment and personnel has been opened in the Ecuadorian municipality of Machala.
During the opening of the new facility, Cuban Minister of Health, Dr. Jose Ramon Balaguer, highlighted the success of the Operation Milagro eye-surgery project in Latin America where it has restored the sight to some 700,000 people with curable eye diseases.
The Cuban minister pointed out that there are some 40 million citizens with eye diseases around the world and 5 million in Latin America, reports Granma newspaper.
Balaguer noted that the opening of this facility contributes to the reinforcing of Cuba-Ecuador bilateral relations.
The inaugural ceremony was also attended by Machala's mayor, Carlos Farquez; Cuban ambassador to Ecuador, Benigno Perez; and Secretary General of Ecuador's vice-presidency, Galo Cevallos.
Over 16,200 operations have been carried out in Ecuador in another two ophthalmologic centers opened in the last two years.
Friday, June 29, 2007
Ecuador Executive, Parliament at Odds
Quito, Jun 26 (Prensa Latina) Disputes between Ecuador s executive and legislative powers intensified on Tuesday, after President Rafael Correa accused Congress of quashing several government projects beneficial for the country.
Among the main proposals, partially or completely disapproved by the legislative body, are legislation for financial control and for increased actions against oil smuggling.
Although the projected regulations aimed at improving the condition of the people, they did not obtain the necessary congressional votes, thus casting doubt upon the already questionable legitimacy of that body.
Last weekend President Rafael Correa accused legislators of only favoring their private economic interests and called for the dissolution of Congress once the Constituent Assembly is established.
Tuesday, June 26, 2007
Ecuador will not write off $1.1 bln cenbank debt
By Carlos Andrade
QUITO, June 25 (Reuters) - Ecuador will not write off a $1.1 billion debt owed to the central bank as previously offered in a new banking bill, but will restructure it instead, according to the president's partial veto of the legislation.
President Rafael Correa had surprisingly included scraping the debt in his original banking bill that aims to boost state control over the banking sector.
His original bill was watered down by Congress, and as a result the bill does not completely eliminate the government's obligation on the debt. Instead, Congress' version of the bill proposes a mechanism where the interest payments on that debt would be spent on social projects such as schools and hospitals.
The elimination of those bonds has long been a pledge of Correa who calls them "illegal" debt and wants to channel those resources to social projects in the poor Andean nation.
"The debt restructuring should be the result of an agreement reached by the creditors and the debtor," said Correa's partial veto draft document.
It is the first time Correa's government has mentioned the need to reach an agreement with creditors for a restructuring.
Correa, a former economy minister, has worried Wall Street with pledges to not pay "illegal" foreign debt, which means debt that was contracted by past corrupt governments.
To help depositors during a series of bank collapses in 1998, the government issued the debt, known as AGD bonds, that the central bank bought.
Congress has 30 days to approve Correa's partial veto or stick to its changed version.
The Rolls and the Shrewd
By Alfredo Vera*
Quito,Jun 25 (Prensa Latina) Voters will have to face a record participatory openness to elect all 130 assembly members who will draw up the Ecuadorian Constitution that will govern the life of the so-called "citizens' revolution."
The process has been proclaimed here as the materialization of change demanded by the accumulation of frustrations for nearly 50 years.
History recalls the phrase coined by journalist Juan sin Cielo (Heavenless John) that he used for months to conclude his articles in El Universo: "Ah, Fidel! Why are you so late?" It was the period when Benjamin Carrion proclaimed that the Americas were demanding its second independence.
During that period, on the streets of Quito and Guayaquil, many youth marched chanting "Cuba Yes, Yankees No!" as part of a tide that washed over Latin America.
From frustration to frustration for several generations many still think the only way to root out injustice and inequities is through a revolution, but not an armed revolution like those of Cuba or the Sandinistas.
Rather, the one Salvador Allende wanted to make in Chile, and which he was not allowed by the oligarchic rightwing, the great media, the insatiable merchants and the military officers who favored the coup, all of whom sponsored by the United States.
A revolutionary yearning for change has again spread throughout the Americas, and social scientists attribute that real and objective fact to the chain of systems (Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay, Nicaragua and Ecuador) that have taken power to proclaim, in their own way, the extinction of the "long night of neoliberalism," as stated by President Rafael Correa.
Many of those governments are oriented to the implementation of a socialist system that, if it belongs to the 21st century, is undoubtedly the child of 20th-century socialism, where the small island of Cuba, which has survived Washington's blockade and non-declared war for nearly 50 years, shines brightly.
Over those 50 years, social groups and political parties, even conservatives and neoliberals, have spoken about changes and even revolutions: if they have not eliminated this lately, democratic leftwing ideology says that it is a revolutionary party.
At present, revolutions are being made with votes that materialize in the people's support for the lists of assembly members, in which not a few shrewd ones, counterrevolutionaries, fifth columns, who believe in alleged "changes", have infiltrated.
They accept the privileges (they call them "conquests") allowed by pseudo-democratic licentiousness, like impunity, illegal profits, peculation, overprices, assaults, marginality, exclusion, fraud, destruction of education, health, hope.
There is everything on the lists, although they forgot to value the intellectuals, scientists, artists, writers, as if they belonged to a lower branch of the people that prefers other scales of human work, those who have "pantallazos".
You have to take an in-depth look in the lists to identify the shrewd ones: batrachians and chameleons that devour illusions.
* The author is a Prensa Latina contributor, former minister of Education and president of the Jose Marti Ecuadorian-Cuban Institute.
Sunday, June 24, 2007
Refounding Ecuador: Style and Substance in the Citizens’ Revolution
Memorandum for the Left Turns Conference, UBC-SFU,
Catherine M. Conaghan, Department of Political Studies, Queen’s University
From Left Turns?
Ruminating in August 2006, Francis Fukuyama portrayed Chavismo as a unique phenomenon, more an oil-induced aberration than inspiring example of
Five months later, on
Since his inauguration, Rafael Correa has been an unstoppable force. By any measure, he is
Even before his electoral victory in November 2006, Correa’s critics fixed on comparing Correa with Chávez.3 Correa’s first hundred days in office did nothing to dampen enthusiasm for the comparisons. Along with his tenacious pursuit of the constituent assembly, Correa has given foreign policy a nationalist make-over and taken up the cause of creating “21st century socialism” (a term used by Chávez in his 2007 inaugural address). With the constituent assembly months away from its election and the dog days of constitution writing in Montecristi, it would be premature to draw definitive conclusions about where
Keeping the recent and still evolving state of the Ecuadorian experience in mind, I will offer some abbreviated observations about the style and substance of Correa’s Citizens’ Revolution, especially in regard to its prospective impact on the party system and political culture. As both past and recent studies show, Ecuador’s party system is characterized by high levels of fragmentation and electoral volatility.5 The fractious party system, in conjunction with emergence of more contentious, movement-centric politics, fuelled recurrent governability crises and profoundly eroded democratic institutionality as evidenced in the irregular removal of three presidents (Abdalá Bucaram, Jamil Mahuad, and Lucio Gutiérrez) from 1997 to 2005. Thus, for the proposed Revolución Ciudadana to be successful in breaking with the multiple “pathologies” of the past (i.e., lack of party discipline, lack of ideological/programmatic coherence, clientelism, personalism, instrumentalism in regard to institutions, etc.), parties and their formas de hacer política must be drastically overhauled. Here are two sets of questions that strike me as important in this realm: 1) Will Correa’s political ascendance result in a significant reconfiguration of the party system and will it strengthen Ecuadorian democracy? 2) Will Correa’s leadership and the political organizations supportive of the Revolución Ciudadana advance the development of a robust public sphere and a democratic political culture?
Admittedly, the questions above are broad brushstrokes for inquiry. Lurking inside these questions is the prickly matter of what kind of democracy Ecuadorians really want, and the values and criteria that we use as social scientists to pass judgement on democratic development. Like
This “Magic Moment”: Consolidating the Left Turn in the Party System?
Correa built his presidential victory around a widespread popular rejection of “traditional” parties. Correa carefully crafted his candidacy as an outsider and enacted the part. At campaign rallies, he brandished a belt as the crowd invited him to “Dale Correa” (Hit ‘em Correa---a symbolic smack down of the corrupt political class) and boogied to a re-interpretation of the Twisted Sister anthem, “We’re Not Going to Take It.”
Correa’s disdain for parties and congress knew no bounds and he showed it by running without a list of congressional candidates. It was a risky, but ultimately rewarding, political decision. By running without a congressional list, Correa distinguished his candidacy from others, and unequivocally identified his campaign with the push for a constituent assembly. Given that his opponents controlled congress in January 2007 (most notably Alvaro Noboa’s PRIAN and Lucio Gutiérrez’s PSP), it was obvious that Correa’s presidency would ride on his ability to break down and/or ignore whatever institutional opposition stood in the way of the constituent assembly. Public opinion polls gave the advantage to Correa. At the start of his presidency, Correa enjoyed an impressive 71 percent approval rating in contrast to congress’s 90 percent disapproval rating.
The convoluted conflict that ensued between Correa and opponents of the constituent assembly cannot be explained in its entirety here (For an overview, see Table 1). What is important to note is that Correa was not only able to win the conflict, but that significant collateral damage was inflicted on the opposition as a result; it accelerated the disarray and decomposition of the rightist and populist political forces (PRIAN, PSP, and PSC). The episode clearly revealed these post-election political organizations to be “parliamentary” vehicles in the worst sense--- that is, as gaggles of legislators with no effective leaders or capacity to mobilize expressions of public support for their side. Will the sting of their profound failure kick start some process of re-thinking and modernizing the right in Ecuador? Business leaders, feeling decidedly left out of the Correa administration, hope so. If it does, the recasting of the right could be one of the more salubrious effects of the Left Turn, albeit an unintended one.
Correa has referred to the electoral process underway for the constituent assembly as “this magic moment.” The alchemy that Correa and his campaign strategists have in mind is a formula aimed at producing a solid majority for the government in the constituent assembly. Correa’s own MPAIS (Movimiento Patria Altiva y Soberana) founded for 2006 presidential race, morphed into Alianza País, an umbrella that houses sixteen parties and organizations that supported his candidacy. But Correa’s relationship to the Alianza and the rest of the left is complex, and shows some signs of strain; partners inside the Alianza have already complained about being marginalized. Complaints will only intensify as activists find themselves excluded from the candidate list for the assembly.7 Thus, the prospects for continuing (or even exacerbating) fragmentation in the party system remain. To date, at least 124 organizations officially have requested the requisite forms to begin the process of collecting signatures for a place on the constituent assembly ballot.
Nonetheless, in light of the president’s popularity and his impressive policy record to date, the government is confident that it will be in a position to do very well in the assembly election.8 The emergent electoral strategy of the government is a complicated mix of cooperation and competition with other groups on the left; at the provincial level, the government will run in varied, selected alliances. Whatever the outcome for organizations on the left, the course of the constituent assembly will likely hinge on the government’s ability to forge and maintain post-election alliances with other organizations on the left such as Pachacutik as well as impose party discipline on its own caucus.
The assembly elections have the potential to induce a substantial alteration of the balance of power in the party system. Parties that performed well in the 2006 presidential and congressional elections (PRIAN and PSP) did so on the basis of their populist appeals and clientele networks. Correa’s personal popularity and social assistance policies are likely to erode those networks.9 To date, one of the most intriguing developments in the Correa administration to date has been the creation of a Secretariat of Peoples, Movements and Social Organizations. Headed by forajido leader Manuela Gallegos, the entity is charged working with existing popular organizations in the administration of social programs --- it takes little imagination to envision how the new government-civil society nexus could be put to work in consolidating support for the assembly elections.
Parties that performed poorly in 2006 (ID, PSC, RED) will suffer from the same problem of how to compete with the popular president who is seen as delivering on his campaign promises, especially in the realm of public spending. In the first months of his government, Correa doubled monthly welfare payments to low-income families (from $15 to $30), doubled the assistance available in the housing loans program (from $1800 to $3600), expanded the small business loan program, mandated subsidized rates on electricity for low-usage households and low cost inputs for agricultural producers, extended benefits in food assistance, and launched a new literacy and free schoolbooks plan. Rival parties of all persuasions are likely to be seen as irrelevant by voters who welcome the government’s pro-active approach to
Inducing macro-level changes in the party system may prove easier than midlevel changes in the nature partisan of organizations and how they govern themselves. Many of the new political organizations are personalistic or clique vehicles, hardly concerned with the niceties of internal democracy. MPAIS is reported to be vetting potential candidates by using a combination of non-binding primaries, public opinion surveys and interviews.10 In short, the party system stands at the brink of major changes in terms of the balance of forces; less clear is whether the internal culture of parties will change in the process.
The Public Sphere and Political Culture: New or Más de lo Mismo?
In the confines of this brief memo, I cannot hope to wrestle with the myriad issues related to the development of democratic political culture. No doubt that colleagues commenting on movement politics will address how mass-based organizations are contributing to this process. In
Let me turn to the equally important question of what is happening “from above.” No subject has inflamed Correa’s critics more than that of his leadership style and rhetoric. Correa’s Manichean views are the daily fare of politics. The president has a colourful collection of epithets that he routinely employs to describe his political opponents: mafiosos, pelucones, engominados, estafadores, saqueadores del Estado, dinosaurios, cadáveres, entreguistas, farsantes, payasos, víboras, lobos. Many seasoned observers note how Correa’s belligerent rhetoric recalls the trash talking of previous populist leaders, Velasco Ibarra and Bucaram; it does not sound like a vocabulary suited to a new, bright, and shiny democratic era. Even more appalling to critics than all the macho talk was Correa’s muscular use of executive power to shred the last vestiges of Ecuador’s tattered institutional order during the conflict over the constituent assembly. Under the president’s orders, the national police, not the courts, became the final arbiter of which congressional deputies could claim their seats. In short, Correa’s rhetoric and bullying mode of conflict-resolution hardly seem conducive to developing a public culture that is tolerant of contending opinions, respectful of rights, and committed to the rule of law. Minister of government Gustavo Larrea argues that the president’s style is a function of the need to demolish the last roadblocks to democratic reform (namely, the obstructionist congress and the corrupt partidocracia) and that the constituent assembly heralds a new phase in politics, one that will be more constructive and less confrontational.12 Whether or not a kinder, gentler Correa is on the horizon, the debate over his leadership style merits further reflection: How does presidential personality and style impact the trajectory of each national Left Turn and what values do charismatic, media-savvy presidents communicate to citizens along the way?
Extrapolating from Ecuador: Questions for Comparative Research
In the process of trying to assess the meaningfulness of the Left Turn in individual national cases and across the region, we must necessarily think in the classic terms of identifying “change and continuity,” and by extension, the possibility of hybrid developments. The research challenge is enormous, combining the need for new empirical research in key areas (state-civil society relations, public policy, presidential leadership, etc.) with a finely-tuned historical understanding of the national contexts in which the Left Turn is played out.
Extrapolating from our consideration of the Ecuador’s recent experience, a research agenda can be configured around the following clusters of questions: 1) How is the Left Turn affecting the dynamics in party system? Is the left a transformative force in party politics? Is the Left Turn remaking the Right? Does the Left Turn disarm populism? 2) How are leftist leaders (and organizations) affecting elite and mass political culture? What are the discourses and norms of leftist politics and do they differ from previous appeals (by the “old” Left and by populists)? Is the left creating a new (democratic) public culture? 3) How is the left defining and affecting democratic institutionality? How does the left relate to the institutional forms of procedural democracy? Do bifurcated views of democracy (“bourgeois democracy” v. substantive democracy, procedural v. majoritarian) compete and affect approaches to institution-building? Is the left advancing new forms of deliberative democracy (as it claims) or are the supposedly new forms of participation prone to the old practices of clientelism and elite domination?
Table 1: Chronology of Institutional Conflict, January-April 2007
| 15 January | Correa signs Decree 002 mandating the consulta popular on the constituent assembly (CA) along with a statute stipulating how the CA will be elected and endowing it with “full powers.” |
| 17 January | Correa sends decree and statute to Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) for implementation, maintaining that congressional approval is not required. |
| 23 January | Pro-CA demonstrators disrupt TSE meeting. TSE votes to send statute to congress for approval. |
| 30 January | Pro-CA demonstrations at congress. Demonstrators break through police cordon, enter building and disrupt activities. |
| 10 February | President Correa reiterates his pledge to create an ad hoc electoral tribunal to organize the consult should the TSE fail to implement the decree |
| 13 February | Congress approves a statute enabling the consulta, but stipulates that the incoming CA cannot dismiss the sitting congress. Also removes requisite that political organizations seek signatures (equivalent to 1 percent of registered voters) for place on CA ballot. TSE announces that the consulta will be held on April 15, 2007. |
| 28 February | Correa sends a revised statute to TSE for approval. Statute does not recognize any limitations on the “full powers” of the CA; also reinstates signature requirements for registration on CA ballot. |
| 1 March | Without remitting revised statute to congress, TSE approves it. |
| 5 March | Legislators file case with Tribunal Constitucional (TC) to challenge the constitutionality of the new statute |
| 6 March | Congressional majority votes to oust TSE president Jorge Acosta |
| 7 March | TSE disregards congress. The TSE votes to strip 57 legislators of their seats and political rights for obstructing the electoral process by voting to remove the TSE president. |
| 8 March | Deposed legislators are blocked from entering congress by police. An angry mob attacks legislators when they attempt to gather at a nearby hotel. |
| 13 March | Correa announces his support for the TSE as the final arbiter in electoral matters, dismissing any TC jurisdiction in the case |
| 19 March | Government announces that deposed legislators will not be permitted to enter congress |
| 20 March | Substitute legislators (suplentes) take the seats of the deposed legislators; new legislators form pro-government Bloque Dignidad caucus. |
| 28 March | Police surround congress, refusing entrance to deposed legislators. |
| 15 April | Consulta Popular is held. 82 percent of voters endorse CA. |
| 23 April | TC rules to reinstate deposed legislators. Correa rejects the ruling and says that deposed legislators should be arrested if they attempt to enter congress. |
| 24 April | Pro-government congressional majority votes to remove TC members on the grounds that their term in office expired in January 2007. |
| 24 April | Prosecutor Elsa Moreno issues request for an arrest warrant for 24 deposed legislators charged with sedition |
| 24 April | Six deposed legislators travel to Bogotá to explore possible request for asylum. |
| 24 April | Correa criticizes arrest warrant request as “ill-timed.” Arrest request is rescinded subsequently. Deposed legislators vow to air their grievances to foreign governments and international institutions. |
1 Francis
2 In line with Lomnitz’s analysis, Correa articulates a dominant nationalist idiom, heavy on historical
references. He evoked the past in his campaign slogan, “La Patria Vuelve.” In addition to Bolívar and Che
Guevara, Correa makes recurrent references to
The new constituent assembly will convene in Alfaro’s birthplace, Montecristi, Manabí. A 164- foot statue
of Alfaro along with an eternal flame is slated for construction at the assembly’s site. See Claudio Lomnitz,
“Foundations of the Latin American Left,” Public Culture 19, 1 (Winter 2007): 23-27.
3 Space limitations do not permit for a complete discussion of the comparisons here; suffice it to say that
the comparisons weigh heavy on the minds of political opponents (as well as some of
distinguished social scientists and journalists). For a discussion, see the cover story, “Autoritarismo:
¿Verdad o paranoia?” Vanguardia,
4 The worst-case scenario was articulated by former president Osvaldo Hurtado (El Comercio, April 1,
2007) who denounced Correa as an aspiring caudillo who would use to assembly to consolidate his control
over all institutions. Hurtado, along with the Unión Demócrata Cristiana, championed the unsuccessful No
campaign to stop the assembly. But even supporters of the assembly are concerned about Correa’s caudillotype
personality and its effects on the left, see César Montúfar, “Democracia y caudillismo,” El Comercio,
5 Scott Mainwaring, Ana María Bejarano and Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez, “The Crisis of Democratic
Representation: An Overview,” in The Crisis of Democratic Representation, ed. Scott Mainwaring, Ana
María Bejarano, and Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez (Stanford:
6 Michael Coppedge, “
Democratic Governance in
7 On May 10, Alianza País announced that it had reached an agreement with two organizations, Alernativa
Democrática and Nuevo País, to support a single list of assembly candidates.
8 The government’s prospects for controlling the assembly were greatly advanced by the provision in the
constituent assembly statute which stipulates that the assembly can approve all measures through an
absolute majority. This means that MPAIS and its allies need just 66 of the 130 seats to wield majority
control.
9 Campaigning will also be affected by the enactment of strict spending limits for political organizations
and a ban on broadcast advertising. Organizations will be limited to using the publicly-financed air time
allotted to them. This is blow to Alvaro Noboa’s PRIAN which relied on its founder’s personal fortune in
the 2006 campaign.
10 Correa’s quick rejection of efforts by his family members to create new “correista” parties was widely
applauded as a positive move to choke off nepotism and personalism.
11 For a fascinating analysis of the forajido rebellion, see Franklin Ramírez Gallegos, La insurrección de
abril no fue solo una fiesta (
12 “La Izquierda que diseña el gobierno,” Vanguardia,
many groups on the left, argue insistently that the constituent assembly process will be a purgative
experience, one that will excise the old ways of doing politics. As Felipe Burbano De Lara noted, the
constituent assembly has replaced revolution in the imaginary of the left, see “La izquierda y la magia,”
Hoy,
Arbitration in Occidental Case Rejected
chron.com, June 23, 2007
QUITO, Ecuador — President Rafael Correa said Saturday that Ecuador has no plans to enter arbitration with Occidental Petroleum Corp. over a canceled contract, contradicting comments his foreign minister made just days ago.
The California-based oil company filed an arbitration claim with the World Bank's International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes in Washington in May 2006 after Ecuador canceled its operating contract, claiming Occidental had broken the terms of the deal. Occidental denies any breach of contract and Ecuador had refused to recognize the arbitration claim.
In a nationally broadcast radio address on Saturday Correa said that "Ecuador and this government has never recognized" the World Bank arbitration body. "We'll continue not to recognize it as an appropriate body to handle the arbitration."
In an interview published Thursday in the Ecuadorean newspaper El Comercio, Foreign Minister Maria Fernanda Espinosa called the arbitration "a legitimate process" and that Ecuador will argue its side. Officials at the Foreign Ministry and the president's office were not immediately available for comment Saturday.
Ecuador canceled Occidental's operating contracts last year and sent troops to seize its assets. Los Angeles-based Occidental is seeking to recover its oil fields and damages of about US$1 billion (euro750,000) _ the amount it invested since 1999 in Ecuador operations.
Occidental officials were not immediately available for comment.
Ecuadorean president: Congress should be dissolved by constitutional assembly
SignOnSanDiego, June 23, 2007
QUITO, Ecuador – Ecuador's president toughened his stance against Congress on Saturday, saying that a special assembly elected to write a new constitution for the politically turbulent country should dissolve the lawmaking body. “I thought the constituent assembly wouldn't have to dissolve Congress ... but with this kind of Congress we're not going to be able to do anything,” Rafael Correa said in his weekly radio address.
The assembly “will have to dissolve Congress,” he said.
Earlier this year, Correa's insistence that the 130-member assembly, which Ecuadoreans are scheduled to elect on Sept. 30, have the power to dissolve the lawmaking body and dismiss any elected official, drove the country into a legal crisis that left Congress closed for more than a month.
He later softened his stance, saying the assembly should only limit Congress' functions.
Correa, whose party holds no seats in Congress, has called the lawmaking body “a sewer of corruption” and blamed the traditional political parties for much of Ecuador's instability.
Ecuador's eighth president in a decade, Correa has vowed to write a new constitution to reduce the power of the “political mafia” he says runs the country. The need for the assembly was overwhelmingly approved in a national referendum in April.
Ecuador's Correa says Congress should be dissolved
QUITO, June 23 (Reuters) - Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa said on Saturday he has changed his mind and wants the widely unpopular Congress to be dissolved by an assembly with powers to rewrite the volatile nation's constitution.
Correa, a leftist ally of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, had previously said he did not favor the dismissal of Congress, even as most Ecuadoreans blame it for helping oust three presidents in a decade.
Since he took office in January, Correa has maneuvered to control Congress, but lawmakers have watered down or rejected some of the government's key legislation.
"Given the quality of this Congress ... I think the assembly will have to dissolve it," Correa said during his weekly radio broadcast. "With this kind of Congress you can't do anything."
Opposition politicians and Correa's party supporters are preparing for the Sept. 30 election that will choose the 130-members of the constitutional assembly.
Correa has said the assembly is needed to put an end to political instability and slash the influence of traditional parties in the judiciary and state-run companies.
Saturday, June 23, 2007
Unesco adds Galapagos to endangered list
Saturday June 23, 2007
The Guardian
The Guardian
The Galapagos Islands may have to be listed as "in danger" because tourism is threatening the environment that helped shape Charles Darwin's theory of evolution, the chairman of Unesco's World Heritage Committee warned yesterday.
The committee begins a weeklong meeting in Christchurch, New Zealand, today and will consider an application from the territory's ruler, Ecuador, to further protect the Galapagos, said Tumu te Heuheu. The islands have "a very fragile ecosystem and there is a need to manage those activities" he said. The Tower of London is another world heritage site being considered for the endangered list.
Delegates will also consider applications to add at least 45 new sites - including Sydney Harbour Bridge, the Sydney Opera House in Australia, and 11 natural sites - to the World Heritage list.
The president of Ecuador, Rafael Correa, declared the archipelago at risk in April and made it a national priority for action. The islands, Ecuador's top tourist draw, were suffering an environmental and social crisis, he said, and needed restrictions on tourist and residency permits.
"A site in danger doesn't mean to say we've lost the benefit of the site," Mr Te HeuHeu told New Zealand's National Radio. "It simply means that there are some matters that need to be tended to with the support from international bodies like Unesco."
The islands were given World Heritage site status by Unesco in 1978 and in 1985 were declared a Biosphere Reserve. This was extended in 2001 to include the 43,500 square miles (70,000 square kilometres) of ocean surrounding the islands.
Thirty-one world heritage sites are already on the danger list.
Ecuador plans to send Congress broad mining reforms
By Alonso Soto
QUITO, Ecuador, June 22 (Reuters) - Ecuador will send a bill to Congress soon to tighten controls on its nascent mining sector and ease the concerns of activists who have protested the environmental risks of awarding concessions.
A top mining official told Reuters in an interview on Friday that the bill will modernize one of the least effective mining laws in Latin America, imposing stricter environmental controls, limiting the duration of exploration concessions and imposing royalties.
Ecuador has no commercial mines, but as production prospects grow on several gold and copper properties, environmental protests have become more commonplace.
"We need Congress to approve these reforms soon," Deputy Mine Minister Jorge Jurado told Reuters. "We can't wait any longer."
The bill would be popular among green groups who have organized protests in mining areas to demand an end to concessions and more protections for the environment.
MORE STATE CONTROL
Jurado said the bill could be in Congress within a month, giving Congress 30 days to change, approve or reject it.
The proposed bill reflects the leanings of President Rafael Correa, who came to power in January after a campaign that promised more state control over its natural resources.
Correa, an ally of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, has pledged to rework oil contracts and review mining concessions.
"We are aware that there will be changes ... we don't have a problem with royalties as long as they are reasonable," said John Haigh, a spokesman at Ascendant Cooper (ACX.TO: Quote, Profile, Research). "They don't need to reinvent the wheel or rush into this."
Jurado said that under the bill, exploration concessions that are currently granted for 30 years could be shortened to two or three years. At the same time companies would be more accountable for the impact of exploration activities.
Currently, Jurado said companies can spend years exploring a claim without informing the government about their operations.
Companies will be allowed under the new bill to request extensions on exploration concessions, Jurado said.
He said Correa is also close to approving the creation of a separate mine ministry from the current energy and mines ministry and forging ahead with plans to build a state-run mining firm.
"We only need a political decision," said Jurado, a former environmental activist. "We could start this process in the coming weeks."
An assembly that aims to rewrite the constitution and whose members will be elected in September would determine where and how some of the largest mining projects would be developed, Jurado said. It could also strike down projects.
Companies such as Corriente Resources, Iamgold Corp. and Aurelian Resources Resources Inc. are exploring for gold and copper in Ecuador.
Ecuador Seeks to Cut Debt Costs by 2010, Patino Says
By Bill Faries
June 22 (Bloomberg) -- Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa will appoint a commission to audit the country's debt in a bid to reduce the government's obligations, Economy Minister Ricardo Patino said.
Patino said the decision will be taken ``in the coming days.'' The government plans to lower debt payments to 12 percent of its budget by 2010 from the 30 percent level that's persisted for most of this decade, he said.
``The audit commission will focus on how we can determine whether debt is illegitimate,'' Patino said. ``This will help the government define its strategy for dealing with its debt.''
Correa won election last year promising to default on illegitimate debt, a term that he hasn't defined. He said he wants to free up government funds for spending on welfare and on social programs. Ecuador needs to double spending on health care and education to 10 percent of gross domestic product by 2011, Patino said.
Deputy Minister Fausto Ortiz said the country may seek financing to pay $160 million in debt due next year to the Latin American Reserve Fund early. An Ecuadorean proposal to delay payment on the debt until 2009 was rejected by the Bogota-based fund on the basis that it would affect the fund's credit rating.
Ecuador's government continues to back the use of the U.S. dollar, Patino said, adding that a constitutional assembly due to be elected September 30 should leave decisions about the nation's currency up to ``monetary authorities.''
Correa has promised to maintain the dollar as the country's official currency during his four-year term. Ecuador adopted the dollar in 2000 a year after defaulting on $6.5 billion in debt.
Patino said he's not concerned about allegations in the country's press and among some opposition parties that two recent videos show he may have sought to influence financial markets. Portions of the videos were first broadcast by the Teleamazonas station.
``I don't have the slightest concern about these accusations,'' Patino said. ``I'm absolutely convinced that I've done my job honestly. I have a clean conscience.''
To contact the reporter on this story: Bill Faries in Quito at wfaries@bloomberg.net .
Ecuador announces interim Mines Minister
Mining Journal Online, June 22, 2007
Ecuador`s president Rafael Correa has chosen Jorge Alban as the interim Minister of Energy and Mines until the new permanent minister is chosen, Pippa Jeffcock of Dynasty Mining told Mining Journal.
"There are two main contenders for the permanent position, Mauricio Davalos Minister in charge of coordinating Economic policy and production and Fander Falconi, National planning Secretary for Ecuador" she said.
Ms Jeffcock also added that the successful candidate would only be in the position for two months until the ministry was split into two separate units and a new minister "who, according to the government, will know about mining" is chosen.
Ecuador AG Appeals to SEC in Debt Probe
Forbes, June 22, 2007
Ecuador on Thursday appealed to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for help with its investigation into a scandal involving the Andean country's foreign debt.
Attorney General Jorge German is investigating whether there were irregularities in Economy Minister Ricardo Patino's February announcement that Ecuador would miss a Feb. 15 deadline for a $135 million payment on its 2030 global bonds.
Patino said Ecuador lacked funds to make the payment before the deadline, but two days later, the government said it would pay on time, raising suspicions Ecuador was trying to spark sharp fluctuations in bond prices.
German said Thursday he asked the U.S. ambassador in Quito to pressure the SEC to provide the names of people who hold Ecuador's 2030 global bonds.
He also ordered an investigation of the Ecuadorean representative of New York-based Citigroup Inc. for allegedly "obstructing justice" by withholding the names of debt holders from authorities. Local Citigroup executives were not available for comment.
The investigation began after a videotape was aired on local TV showing Patino meeting with investors and a former Ecuadorean economy minister discussing a plan to "shock" the market by driving down the bond prices and allowing them to shoot up after the announcement of an on-time payment. Patino, who denies the allegations, said he recorded the meeting himself to expose "corruption" in the debt sector.
The attorney general also ordered an investigation of the Ecuadorean representative of New York-based Citigroup Inc. for allegedly "obstructing justice" by withholding debt holder names from authorities.
Friday, June 22, 2007
Ecuador may charge Citibank exec over debt probe
QUITO, June 21 (Reuters) - Ecuador's top prosecutor on said on Thursday it may charge a Citibank executive with obstruction of justice for refusing to release the names of bond-holders as part of a proble into allegations of insider dealing.
Prosecutor Jorge German last month demanded Citibank release names of bond-holders who received payments for the country's 2030 global bonds as part of an investigation into allegations that the economy minister manipulated debt markets.
In a statement, the prosecutor's office said it started an investigation on Citibank's representative in Ecuador, Bernardo Chancin.
Citibank was not immediately available for comment. But the world's largest bank by market value has said it would cooperate with Ecuadorean authorities.
Once the investigation is over German will decide whether to charge Chancin with obstruction of justice.
Ecuadorean authorities are investigating allegations of irregularities raised by a secret video released by a television channel that showed minister Ricardo Patino talking with investors about spooking the market to profit from the sale of debt insurance.
The tape fuelled opposition accusations of market manipulation.
Patino denies any wrongdoing and said he ordered the taping of the meeting to show how some market insiders try to manipulate the market to make a profit.
Congress is debating whether to censure Patino, but President Rafael Correa has the final word on his job.
German has said the identity of bondholders is key to determine if there were any irregularities in the payment of a bond coupon in mid-February.
Ecuador - Having it both ways
Jun 21st 2007 | QUITO
From The Economist print edition
To be green or to be rich, must that be the question?
THE Yasuní National Park in Ecuador's Amazonian rainforest is one of the most biodiverse spots on earth. In 1989 it was designated a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve. Under it lie the Ishpingo Tambococha Tiputini oilfields with estimated reserves of almost 1 billion barrels, representing almost a quarter of the country's total known reserves. Their exploitation could produce around $700m a year—a big temptation for Ecuador's leftist president, Rafael Correa, who is anxious to find a way to finance his new populist social policies. But he has also pledged to promote environmentally friendly policies, and this often clashes with his need for cash.
Some of his more radical supporters had hoped for a moratorium on new oil development and other environmentally unfriendly activities such as mining and logging. Instead Mr Correa seems to be leaning towards what he calls “development in communion with, not against, nature” to pay for his “21st century socialism”. Many even within his own administration are unhappy with this apparent betrayal of his green ideals. His minister for energy and mines, Alberto Acosta, an economist and ardent green, recently resigned after clashing with state oil-company officials over his plan for the oilfields.
Under this plan, launched this month by the president, the government would agree not to develop the oilfields in return for an annual payment of $350m—half the expected revenue from its exploitation. Paid by whom? Mr Correa talks of it being raised through “donations, debt trades and unexploited crude-oil certificates” from the “international community”. How it would in practice work is anyone's guess.
Some greens have hailed the proposal as “creative” and a “sign of the future”. But most people regard the whole idea as pie-in-the-sky. Why should anyone be willing to subsidise Ecuador, by no means the poorest country in Latin America, to keep its oil in the ground? Ecuador already spends three times as much on annual fuel subsidies, much of it feeding contraband, as it could expect to earn from the Yasuní oil fields. Furthermore, the donations would go more toward social programmes rather than environmental conservation.
Even Mr Correa does not seem convinced that the plan will work. Rather than cheerleading the initiative at its launch, he spent more time warning voters that the government might have to sink oil wells anyway. But he may earn some credit with environmentalists for trying. And if it does not work, he can always blame the outside world for being so stingy.
Ecuador also has rich metal deposits, mainly gold and copper, worth as much as $160 billion. But mining activities are still limited. Mr Correa says Ecuador will help to develop both its mining and its oilfields to lift itself out of poverty. But, as Mr Acosta liked to point out, this is a country that has produced about 4 billion barrels of oil, worth some $82 billion, since production began 40 years ago—and poverty is still a problem. Besides, those green issues, on which much of Mr Correa's appeal is based, will not simply fade away.
Wednesday, June 20, 2007
Ecuador On A Tightrope: Foreign Minister Espinosa Uses Caution In Casting Ecuador’s Divergencies and Affinities In Its Regional Policies
From COHA, June 19, 2007
June 19th, 2007
Word Count: 1100
On June 7, 2007, the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) was invited to participate in a meeting with Ecuador’s foreign minister, Maria Fernanda Espinosa. In spite of a very thoughtful and earnest presentation, it was fully apparent that, for mainly economic reasons, the left-leaning Rafael Correa administration is anxious to mount a two-court strategy in order to preserve a beneficial economic relationship with Washington while still qualifying as a pink tide country. COHA also recently had as a visitor Ecuador’s attorney general, José Xavier Garaicoa Ortiz, who, in coordination with this strategy, emphasized the importance of careful and correct ties with Washington, except on several leading edge foreign policy issues. Ortiz’s presentation became somewhat more firm when he stated that Ecuador would not, under any circumstances, be renewing the agreement allowing a U.S. military base in Manta, Ecuador and expects to take a hard but conciliatory stand on the border security issue, particularly in regard to Colombia. Meanwhile, President Correa preaches a somewhat more strident and autonomous position in concert with President Hugo Chavez and some of Venezuela’s and Ecuador’s other allies.
Ecuador Seeks Considerations from Washington
Although Ecuador, on economic grounds, has completely ruled out a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the U.S., at the same time, it is intent on preserving social cohesion and political stability with its neighboring Andean Community (CAN) countries, as well as Washington. Ecuador hopes that the U.S. Congress will reinstate the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) for a more sustained period of time rather than the two-year period being touted by the Bush Administration. The Trade Promotion Act was first established to recognize the sacrifices made by the Andean populations to combat narcotraffiking. The effects of the ATPDEA have reflected a reciprocally-beneficial relationship between the U.S. and Ecuador, a fact that was emphasized during the COHA conversations with both the Ecuadorian foreign minister and attorney general. Additionally there were utterances by other cabinet and mid-level officials, who apparently have been instructed by the president to take a softer line on what otherwise could be construed as contentious issues.
ATPDEA Very Important to Correa
As Ecuadorian officials are quick to stress, ATPDEA yields a number of summary benefits for the U.S. which should not be minimized: primarily it acts as a buffer to prevent unrestricted migration into the U.S. at zero cost for U.S. taxpayers. Also, 75 percent of the funds spent by the U.S. in Ecuador revert back to the U.S. as a result of Ecuador’s in-country purchases. In Ecuador, ATPDEA is calculated to have generated about 350,000 jobs as well as to serve as a barrier against employment in the illegal drug industry. Moreover, according to Bernardo Traversari, Executive Director of the Ecuadorian-American Chamber of Commerce and a member of foreign minister Espinosa’s delegation, “wages in these industries are higher than those paid in Colombia to workers cultivating illegal drugs, which from a labor standpoint, is very important because it provides less temptation to fall into illegal activities.” Evidently, ATPDEA contributes heavily to Ecuador’s position as a drug-free country among surrounding nations that are better known as Olympic-ranked players in the illicit drug business.
According to Espinosa, “Ecuador remains a drug-free country despite its geographic position.” But the ramifications of being in this position very much depend on the continuation of ATPDEA. Ecuador indirectly relies on some funding from the U.S. for aid in stabilizing its borders with fractious neighboring countries, particularly Colombia where anti-drug fumigants regularly float over the northern border, adversely affecting the health of Ecuadorian nationals. As a result, Ecuador bears most of the cost of maintaining 13 fixed security check points and 30,000 troops to protect the border. Jeff Sheedy, CEO of Textiles La Escala and President of the Ecuadorian Textile Association, made Ecuador’s reliance on ATPDEA perfectly obvious when he said, “1.5 million people depend on this industry in Ecuador, which is an equivalent of 37 million people in the United States who would be affected by a change in ATPDEA.”
Correa and Manta
Ultimately, President Correa’s more bravo statements may have been better fashioned for the Latin American market than for Washington. It is evident from talking with Espinosa and her delegation, as well as in an earlier visit with the country’s attorney general, that the Quito government is functioning on a very careful level of diplomacy that is meant to generate the best advantages for the Correa Administration from almost all of Ecuador’s associations. President Correa’s often radical speeches contrast with Espinosa’s and Attorney General Ortiz’s markedly more guarded approach. For example, Correa announced recently that his country will not be renewing the Manta base agreement with the U.S. military, which will deny Washington the continual use of a Forward Operating Location (FOL) in Ecuador, whose main objective is drug-trafficking surveillance.
It was risky for Ecuador to so adamantly refuse a continued U.S. military presence on its territory after the Manta lease expires, seeing as it could invite a chilly U.S. response to Ecuador’s push to extend ATPDEA for a longer rather than shorter period. In addition, Ecuador has announced it will not participate in this year’s UNITAS Pacific military exercises. UNITAS Pacific is an annual naval regatta that traditionally involves elements of the fleets of Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and the U.S. UNITAS Pacific drills have been carried out uninterrupted since 1959. If Manta is an irritant to U.S.-Ecuadorian relations, the latter’s recent and abrupt cancellation of hosting this year’s UNITAS Pacific exercises may signal that relations between the Correa administration and Washington could continue to be bumpy in the near future, in spite of Ecuador’s best efforts, if the U.S. decides to punish Ecuador for its perceived insolence against Washington’s ego. In a tit-for-tat exchange, Correa’s tactics fully reveal Ecuador’s sensitivity over issues of sovereignty, by its firm stance on military matters with the U.S. such as Manta and UNITAS Pacific, while espousing a calculated moderate position on other bilateral issues.
Warm Abrazo on Some Issues; Cool Handshake on Others
Foreign Minister Espinosa emphasized to COHA that, “Ecuador aims to have the best relationship with all countries and to be a neutral convener in the region that can bridge different interests. Ecuador wants to maintain its strong historical ties with the United States, but will not leave aside the interests of its Latin American brothers and sisters. We have an excellent relationship with our neighboring countries, including Venezuela.” To a large extent, this cautious approach displays the well thought out ambiguity of U.S.-Ecuadorian relations, or at least a bifurcation in Ecuador’s geopolitical position, based upon the fact that Ecuador is not blessed with almost unlimited oil reserves, yet still needs access to a major market like the U.S. While Ecuador’s heart may remain in Caracas, the hard reality is that a beneficial economic relationship with the U.S. is essential. .
June 19th, 2007
Word Count: 1100
Tuesday, June 19, 2007
Ex-presidential rival to run for Ecuador assembly
June 18, 2007
QUITO (Reuters) - Ecuador's richest man and former presidential candidate Alvaro Noboa will seek election to an assembly that will rewrite the country's constitution and oppose President Rafael Correa's plans, a Noboa ally said on Monday.
Noboa, a 56-year-old banana tycoon, lost to Correa in last year's face-off presidential election in which he received 43 percent of the votes.
"We want to use that percentage to keep Correa from winning a majority in the assembly," said Gloria Gallardo, a former lawmaker and senior member of Noboa's party.
"We will defend companies and individual freedoms from Correa's 21st century socialism," she added.
Elections for the 130 seats in the constitutional assembly will be held on September 30.
Correa, an ally of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, said he wants the assembly to curtail the powers of traditional political parties in the judiciary and state firms. He also wants to strip powers from Congress, widely blamed by Ecuadoreans for toppling three presidents in a decade.
Noboa's Institutional Renewal Party of National Action lead a fierce opposition to Correa in Congress until most of its lawmakers were fired in March for trying to block his plans to create the assembly.
Correa is supporting his former energy minister and close adviser Alberto Acosta to lead his party's list of candidates for the September assembly elections.
Political pundits expect the charismatic Correa to win a majority in the assembly by using his popularity and ties with influential Indian groups.
Noboa will make his candidacy official later on Monday, Gallardo said.
Latin American democracy: time to experiment
In Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela, leaders are seeking new sources of political legitimacy in which participation is at the heart, reports John Crabtree.
30 - 04 - 2007
Ecuadoreans voted massively on 15 April 2007 in favour of holding a constituent assembly. The referendum result was an important victory for the president elected in November 2006, Rafael Correa. He is seeking to exploit a deep-rooted public hostility towards the country's political class to rewrite his country's political ground-rules, partly by extending political participation. In doing so, he appears to be following in the footsteps of Venezuela's Hugo Chávez and Bolivia's Evo Morales.
In the event, some three-quarters of Ecuadorean voters gave Correa's plans to rewrite the constitution their support, albeit with a fairly low voter turn-out in a nation where voting is compulsory. The elections to a constituent assembly are now due to take place in September 2007. The assembly will then have at least 180 days in which to come up with a new constitutional draft. The assembly is to have "full powers", which means (in theory at least) that it will enjoy supremacy over the existing chamber of deputies.
Correa's plans to hold a referendum had been at the centre of his appeal to voters during two rounds of presidential voting in the October-November election. He argued that this was what was required if his new government was to tackle the power of the country's established political elite. Only such a reform, he argued, would allow the country's poor majority - to whom his campaign was mainly directed - to participate fully and effectively in the affairs of state.
To emphasise his antipathy to what he has called the partidocracia, Correa refused to endorse any candidates in the 2006 legislative elections, a high-risk strategy since he now has no organised backing in parliament and has to rely on a motley coalition to endorse government decisions. Parliamentary approval to hold a referendum was only achieved after fifty-seven opposition deputies were suspended for ostensibly acting in an anti-constitutional way.
Correa's critics accuse him of running roughshod over Ecuador's political institutions, and using his current public support to manipulate the country's constitution to his own devices. Rather than opening up the political system, they accuse him of simply following in the footsteps of Venezuelan president, Hugo Chávez, in seeking to subvert democratic institutions.
In the last decade, Ecuador has been one of Latin America's most unstable countries. Between 1996 and 2005, three elected presidents have been forced out before they could finish their allotted four-year terms. There has been almost constant friction between the executive and the legislature ever since the end of military rule in the late 1970s. A new constitution, introduced as recently as 1998, has not helped matters. And the country's main political parties have suffered a much of an erosion of public support as anywhere in Latin America. They are widely reviled as being both inept and corrupt.
The Venezuelan precedent
In some ways, this mood of antipathy towards conventional politics parallels the situation which, in 1999, led to the election victory of Chávez in Venezuela. Once elected on a wave of antipathy towards the country's two main parties, Chávez moved swiftly towards reformulating the constitution. First he first won ratification for holding a constituent assembly in a referendum. Then the government won a large majority in the assembly, and was able to reform the country's political ground-rules as it sought fit, among other things extending the president's term to six years (previously it had been four) and removing the legal bar on immediate re-election. Then the new constitutional draft was approved by plebiscite, and finally Chávez won fresh presidential elections under the new rules.
The Venezuelan experiment in institutional re-engineering picked up - in rather different circumstances - on an earlier experiment by the then president of Peru, Alberto Fujimori. Fujimori, having actually closed down congress in 1992, proceeded to elect a new legislature with powers to rewrite the constitution. The new constitution was also then submitted to a plebiscite. The 1993 constitution also removed the legal impediment to presidential re-election, paving the way for Fujimori's handsome electoral victory two years later. Fujimori sought to bypass democratic institutions, concentrating power in his own hands.
But Fujimori's policy objectives differed greatly from those of Chávez. He used his enhanced presidential power to push through an agenda of far-reaching privatisation and economic liberalisation, whereas Chávez has sought to reverse the Washington consensus-based policies of previous Venezuelan governments. But like Chávez, and more recently Correa, Fujimori justified his attempts to refashion the political system by responding to a deep sense of disillusion among voters with the workings of the partidocracia.
The Bolivian experience
Bolivia provides a more recent example of the attempt to rebuild political institutions, and for Correa it may be a more influential precedent than Venezuela. The election victory of Evo Morales in December 2005, like those of Correa and Chávez, was fuelled by a powerful adverse reaction by voters to what had gone before. In October 2003, the government of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, one of Bolivia's wealthiest businessmen, was brought down by public protests. Morales picked up on that spirit of rejection.
Bolivian plans for constitutional reform - currently being debated in the colonial city of Sucre - involve widening the channels for participation in politics, especially on the part of Bolivia's hitherto largely excluded indigenous population. Ecuador and Bolivia are among the south American countries with proportionately the largest indigenous populations, as well as being countries where indigenous peoples have emerged in recent years as powerful political actors.
Closely connected to indigenous politics is the issue of natural-resource use, a lively topic in both Bolivia as well as in Ecuador. Bolivia in 2006 brought back into national ownership the country's gas resources while, in Ecuador, Correa's predecessor had presided over the withdrawal of Occidental Petroleum, the country's largest foreign investor. In both countries, the activities of foreign multinationals have been a potent political issue.
The new draft Bolivian constitution is supposed to be finalised in August, a year after the assembly initiated its activities. It is then due to be submitted to a national referendum. However, the assembly's progress has been hobbled by the right-of-centre opposition's refusal to accept the government's proposals on voting procedures. With less than half of the seats in the assembly, but more than a third, the opposition has held out for a system by which each reform has to be approved by a two-thirds majority. The tough tactics used by the Bolivian opposition in Sucre will not be lost on the economically powerful Ecuadorean opposition.
The president's re-election may also emerge as an important issue in Bolivia, and probably Ecuador. Morales, following the Venezuelan example, has made it known that he intends to stand for re-election as president under the new constitution, as well as holding fresh elections to congress. These would probably occur sometime in the first half of 2008. He believes his popularity will hold up. Assuming that the presidential term remains five years, re-election would confirm him in office until at least 2013. In Ecuador, where Correa is still only five months in to having only just been elected for the first time, Correa has yet to make clear whether he would follow down this road, but many of his critics assume this is his game-plan.
Re-election and participation
The impediments to immediate re-election have already been removed in several other countries of south America. In Brazil, it was the then president Fernando Henrique Cardoso who reformed the constitution to enable himself to stand (successfully) for a second term. He hoped thereby to reinforce the liberalising economic reforms of his first term. President Luis Inàcio Lula da Silva took advantage of this amendment in 2006 to win re-election as president, albeit on an economically more ambiguous ticket than Cardoso.
In Argentina, it was Carlos Menem who changed the constitution to enable himself to run again. He too sought an extended period in office to consolidate neo-liberal reforms. And like Fujimori in Peru, he sought to cultivate a direct rapport with the people in ways that bypassed institutional controls. Later in 2007, it is likely that President Néstor Kirchner will take advantage of this to stand again - that is, if he decides against allowing his wife Cristina to stand in his place.
In Colombia, also, President Álvaro Uribe has also successfully engineered a second term on the back of a constitutional amendment that broke with the long-standing limitation on immediate re-election. Buoyed up by the popularity of his first term, he took office for a second one in August 2006.
Only Mexico, of the larger countries of Latin America (other than Chile), seems to have held firm against the immediate re-election tide. Here, the 1917 constitution holds firm, and with it the sacred principle - on which the Mexican revolution was initially fought - that no publicly-elected official should be allowed to seek re-election. And, as those who would like to privatise the oil industry have repeatedly discovered, the Mexican constitution is not easy to change.
However, unlike the processes of constitutional reform in Venezuela, Bolivia and (possibly) Ecuador, the one-off removal of impediments to re-election in Brazil, Colombia and Argentina did not involve projects designed to enhance participation by those at the margins of the political system. It is here that the three Andean countries are seeking to breaking new ground. Although critics of Hugo Chávez would argue that this has not led to popular empowerment, rather the concentration of power in the president, there can be no doubt that in Venezuela - at least for the foreseeable future - new stakeholders emerging and the power of the old partidocracia has been broken.
Whether constitutional change in Ecuador or Bolivia really leads to empowerment of the previously excluded, or just to the enhancement of those in government, remains to be seen.
This article is published by John Crabtree , and openDemocracy.net under a Creative Commons licence. You may republish it free of charge with attribution for non-commercial purposes following these guidelines. If you teach at a university we ask that your department make a donation. Commercial media must contact us for permission and fees. Some articles on this site are published under different terms.
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